

16 dec 11 1
R&R 7

K&K (21): unknown prob!

known prob: how l.a. \rightarrow no real risk
maximise

unique events. New risks!

1st reply

de. F, Ramsey, Savage:

(a) Assign subj. prob^s to events.
(capture \approx risk)

(b) Then maximise EU.

\rightarrow Allais & PT 79. For risk; non EU
you know non EU for risk. But now, uncertainty.

Question: please invent your bias
to audience - non EU for uncertainty.
replace EU in (b) by RDU/PT.

Prob. soph + RDU!

$(E_1: x_1, \dots, E_n: x_n)$

$(p_1: x_1, \dots, p_n: x_n)$
RDU



schief ck
net.

Trouble coming...

Ellsberg ...

K: 100 balls
50 R, 50 B

A: $\frac{100}{100}$ balls
R B



$$\frac{P(B_R) > P(B_a)}{P(R_R) > P(R_a)} = \frac{1}{1}$$

⊗ No prob. soph!

Other example: homebias

Need something more fundamentally different.

To prepare, RDU + prob-soph.

$$x_1 \geq \dots \geq x_n$$

$$E_1 \circ x_1, \dots, E_n \circ x_n$$

$$P_j = P(E_j)$$

$$p_1 \circ x_1 \quad \dots \quad p_n \circ x_n$$

$$\sum \pi_j U(x_j)$$

$$\pi_j = W(p_j + \dots + p_n) - W(p_{j-1} + \dots + p_n)$$

$$= W(P(E_j \cup \dots \cup E_n)) - W(P(E_{j-1} \cup \dots \cup E_n))$$

$$= W_0 P(E_j \cup \dots \cup E_n) - W_0 P(E_{j-1} \cup \dots \cup E_n)$$

outcome event

(gai h)rank (event)

$$W = W_0 P$$

$$= W(E_j \cup \dots \cup E_n) - W(E_{j-1} \cup \dots \cup E_n)$$

shipped all this. Too long for oral

Take $W: \mathcal{Z}^S \rightarrow [0,1]$. Generalised prob. 4
 W satisfies:

(*) $W(\emptyset) = 0$; $W(S) = 1$; $A \supset B \Rightarrow W(A) \geq W(B)$

skip { Now generalise: take any such W , also if no underlying P

W is (event) weighting function
if $W: \mathcal{Z}^S \rightarrow [0,1]$, satisfies (*).

said every or always } No P need exist. } skip
} Could P still always exist? }
} No! Almost never! } skip

$E_i \stackrel{R_i}{\cup} \dots \cup E_i$: ranked event

generic: \underline{F}^R

$\pi(\underline{F}^R) = W(E \cup R) - W(R)$ } skip-ped

RDU: \exists an increasing concave

$$U: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R},$$

\exists weighting function w ,

s.t.

$$x_1 \geq \dots \geq x_n,$$

$$(F_1 = x_1, \dots, F_n = x_n) \rightarrow$$

$$\sum \pi_j U(x_j)$$

marginal contribution of F_j

$$\pi_j = W(F_1 \cup \dots \cup F_j) - W(F_1 \cup \dots \cup F_{j-1})$$

E^R : ranked event $\hat{\pi}(E^R) = W(E \cup R) - W(R)$

Eg: $\pi_1 = \pi(E_1) = W(E_1)$, $\pi_2 = \pi(E_2^E) = W(E_2 \cup E_1) - W(E_1)$

Exercise: Assume U linear

How elicite $w(E)$?

Recall $P(E)$ - measurement (1st session)

$$d \sim \frac{1}{E} 0 \Rightarrow d = w(E)$$

they did not bid.

2017:

10:33-10:44

2017: They did!

Because I explained $w(E)$, $\pi(E)$

Ellsberg accommodated:

Book p. 281 Fig 10.1.1 → screen!
take before you.

U linear.

$$W(B_R) = W(R_R) = 0.4$$

$$W(B_G) = W(R_G) = 0.3$$

None!

Ellsberg accommodated

Not "explained."

W too general ...

{
more laxer

10:15 - 10:25 Break

First, we consider where π
 RDU uncertainty \approx risk
 "big" R is bad.

Pessimism ask

$$R' \succ R \Rightarrow \pi(ER') \geq \pi(ER)$$

Optimism :

\leq

define conv. this way.

trivial Tem: Pessimism $\Leftrightarrow W$ convex. Or

explain

llh ans:

$$\pi(E^b) \geq \pi(E^R) \text{ on } [\emptyset, W_{rb}]$$

$$E^R \leq W_{rb} \\ (\text{p}^R \leq w_{rb})$$

$$\pi(E^w) \geq \pi(E^R) \text{ on } [B_{rb}, S]$$

$$R \geq B_{rb} \\ (\text{n}^R \geq b_{rb})$$

Fig 10.4.1, p. 293
(x s. th. pr. \rightarrow opt/pass)

TO \Rightarrow u measurement
Put up fig. 4.1.1 & say
if know u:

was their
exercise
9.4.2

$$x \sim \frac{1}{E} \Rightarrow W(E) = \frac{u(x) - u(0)}{u(0) - u(0)}$$
$$x^j \sim \frac{1}{E} x^0 \Rightarrow W(E) = j/4$$

X kan CCCI toe AT
file is max updated

Belen
niet. wae
maelen ze
ermee?

Literature on ambiguity

Strange - Only normative

I too Regression

I only descriptive

only aversion (like KDU in

Insensitivity ...? Amb is too rich!



New phenomena under uncertainty

Engaging in your minds:
(+ : too general
* : no graphs, no indexes)

New phenomena:
Source dependence

Different kinds of events =>
Different attitudes

Risk: one source. So no source dependence.

Source: group of events generated by same random mechanism.

Known urn Unknown urn
of NK

smooth behaviour!?

Erasmus skip X
Dutch Rutte too subtle?
still prime
minister in
2 months

H:
Fair coin
Heads

Ask E: 100 vs H: 100

They:

E: 100 > H: 100

amb. seeking?

No! E more likely.

Belief! Not amb. sh.

Should control for belief.

Ellsberg urns: symmetry
controls for beliefs

skipped for time
skipped for time
skipped for time

skipped

Other way } skip

Sources A, B define

$$A \succeq B \ \& \ A^c \succeq B^c \quad (*)$$

suggests pref of A over B .

Formally: source pref of A over B

$(*)$ may be, but never

$$B \succeq A \ \& \ B^c \succeq A^c$$

Source pref. of A over B :

$$w(B) \succeq w(A) \Rightarrow w(B^c) \preceq w(A^c)$$

Not sensitive w.r.t. δ than

w.r.t.: B in site.

How get traceability? ¹²

Source method:

Take uniform sources.

A uniform: $w(A) = \frac{w}{A} P(A)$

Fig 10.1.1 p.281

Accommodate Ellsberg with source method:

U_B

U_A

$$P(B) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$P(A) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$w_B\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = 0.4$$

$$w_A\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) = 0.3$$

Bring back prob^s in Ellsberg!

skipped

Taking stock. Do formula for source method

$$(E_1, x_1, \dots, E_n, x_n)$$

W, U, RDU

Take source S_0 of $F = \epsilon$

$$\text{Take } W(E) = w_{S_0} P(E_j)$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n (w_{S_0} P(E_{j0} \dots \cup E_j) - w_{S_0} P(E_{j-1} \cup \dots \cup E_j)) U(x_j)$$

Have to measure U, P, w_{S_0}

TO
 nl

source function

W via Abdellouci
 (PEJ maar dan met
 events)

$w_{S_0} P^1 = w_{S_0}$

much less work than $W!$

Nice thing:

Can draw graphs

W₅₀ capturing ambiguity attitudes

Can calculate indexes.
(you did a formula)

Show graphs of AER

pessimism: amb. av.
insensitivity: a-insensitivity

PT :

put everything together:

U

w^+

w^-

x $x_1 \geq \dots \geq x_b \geq 0 \geq x_{b+1} \geq \dots \geq x_n$

$x = E_1: x_1, \dots, E_a: x_a$

$\rightarrow \sum_{j=1}^b \pi_j U(x_j) + \sum_{i=b+1}^n \pi_i U(x_i)$

w^+

w^- loss weights

Empirical findings:

Amb. amplifies risk

Amb. seeking for losses

show annotated bill
on internet

Rich between source variation
many emotions, many kinds of info

One risk attitude for
all nonmonetary outcomes"

is as close as

"one ambiguity attitude"

Did not say.